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Abstract Reworking psychology’s methodology is of utmost importance if the discipline
is to progress. This paper explores methodological strategies which could help overcome
the methodological crisis outlined by Toomela (Culture of Science: Strange History of
the Methodological Thinking in Psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral
Science, 2007, doi:10.1007/s12124-007-9004-0). First, I describe a classic research
program (i.e., Bartlett’s experiments on remembering) that exemplifies the virtues of a
“German–Austrian” approach to psychology. Second, I elaborate upon these insights to
investigate other aspects of remembering. Finally, I conclude by outlining a
methodological programmatic for future research in psychology that overcomes existing
forms of experimentation in a new synthesis. The new methodology borrows from both
traditions advancing via rich description of single cases and their qualitative
transformation to complex theory capable of explaining all individual cases.
Keywords Methodology . Remembering . Bartlett . Conversation .
Idiographic science
PERHAPS EVERY GENERATION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS has proclaimed a crisis of one kind or
another. Vygotsky’s Crisis (1987) shows that voicing the concern can be instructive
in overcoming it. What is important is not to merely lament over the present state of
things but to point out constructively what is missing so that we can creatively put
together a remedy. In this way, Toomela (2007) rigorously outlines the shortcomings
of contemporary psychology’s methodology. Today’s inadequacies are shown to us
in clear profile against the backdrop of the German–Austrian conception of
psychology as a science, which has been largely lost to psychology since the
Second World War.
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The task that stands before us is one of overcoming existing forms of
experimentation (both past and present) by developing new methods and theoretical
ideas so powerful that they cannot be ignored by the mainstream. One way of going
about this is to look back at some of the classic experiments in psychology in search
of tools that may be appropriated for the discipline today. Our aim is not the
mindless copying of the great predecessors but rather a careful and intelligent
adaptation of their insights to our own questions.
My contribution here will be twofold: (1) to present a concrete classical example
of a productive program of psychological experimentation which exemplifies the
virtues of the German–Austrian orientation—outlined by Toomela in his eight
dimensions of difference; and (2) to develop the insights from this example for
contemporary use sketching out a new methodology of experimentation that borrows
from both German–Austrian and American approaches. In this way I will look to the
past for ideas to help rebuild the discipline today. The psychologist I intend to
consider is not German, nor did he belong to any other country in continental
Europe. In fact, he was English, though very much steeped in the continental
tradition.
Bartlett’s Methodology for Studying Remembering
Frederic Bartlett came to be the most influential English psychologist of his time.
Though he is appreciated for diverse contributions to psychology I will focus on his
most famous work Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology.
While reading Remembering (1932) one is struck by the wealth of rich data, the
detailed qualitative analysis of whole single cases, and the multiple layers of
theoretical interpretation. We find ourselves in a different world of psychology, in
which a foreign set of assumptions about psychology as a science are at work. Yet
they do work—we come away at the very least intrigued and in many cases
convinced. The brilliance of Remembering is its simultaneous closeness to the
phenomena, through unprocessed data (e.g., several complete reproductions of a
story remembered by a subject), and at the same time, a rigorous analysis of it for the
development of complex theory that takes into account all individual cases. In what
follows I will show by what methodological strategy Bartlett was able to accomplish
this feat. Though he used a variety of methods for studying remembering, I will
concentrate on one of his earliest and best known, the method of repeated
reproduction.
Bartlett was not the first to use the method of repeated reproduction though he
used it more productively than those who came before and after. This was a result of
his distinctive style of analysis, in which he concentrates on qualitative trans-
formations in individual cases in search of processes common to all cases. His
method of repeated reproduction can be understood to take place in four steps:
& First, a series of reproductions is created.
& Second, the series is analyzed for what is added, deleted and transformed from
one reproduction to the next.
& Third, general trends of change are identified.
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& Fourth, comparisons with results from other experiments and phenomena in the
world are made to create or alter a general theory that will apply to all individual
cases.
These “steps” are my invention, for the purposes of a clear explanation of the
method, and as such should not be thought of as rigidly fixed or as the exact order in
which Bartlett must have followed in implementing his method; rather it is best to
think of them as a formal structure to guide inquiry, not determine it. Each step will
be treated in turn:
First, the basic idea behind the method of repeated reproduction is quite simple.
A subject is shown some material, e.g. a folk tale or graphic symbol, and then at
increasing time delays he is asked to reproduce it. Thus, we are left with a single
individual’s series of reproductions, branching out from the original material. The
following is an example of data produced using the method of repeated reproduction
for the story War of the Ghosts (though not of the subject’s full reproduction which
Bartlett includes):
The Original
He told it all, and then he became quiet. When the sun rose he fell down.
Something black came out of his mouth. His face became contorted. The people
jumped up and cried.
He was dead.
First Reproduction (time after reading story not given)
It was nearly dawn when the man became very ill; and at sunrise a black
substance rushed out of his mouth, and the natives said one to another: “He is
dead.”
Second Reproduction (nearly four months later)
Then, I think it is, the natives describe what happened, and they seem to have
imagined seeing a ghost coming out of his mouth. Really it was a kind of
materialization of his breath. I know this phrase was not in the story, but that is
the idea that I have. Ultimately the man died at dawn the next day
(Bartlett 1932: 70–71, bold added)
Both pre- and post-Bartlett researchers have employed the methods this far to
produce a series of reproductions. However, we will see in what follows that this is
not far enough, that a distinctive style of analysis is now required.
Second, to analyze this series Bartlett attended to what was added, deleted, and
transformed from the original to first reproduction and from one reproduction to the
next. In doing this he was reading between reproductions and thus treating the series
as a single movement. To take just one example of this kind of analysis, look at what
happens to “something black” (in bold): From the original to first reproduction the
“something black” becomes the slightly more concrete “black substance.” In second
reproduction it is transformed in two directions: one being what is remembered and
the other being an interpretation of this element. With this reproduction the subject
gives the story a clear supernatural element, but one that is intelligible to the English
and differs significantly from the original. We have grown up with ghost stories, but
not with stories that end with black substances coming out of the mouth. It is also
interesting to note that this supernatural element must be rationalized; it wasn’t really
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a ghost, just “the materialization of his breath.” This interpretation tames the story—
the supernatural element becomes an illusion.
In contrast to Bartlett’s sensitivity to individual cases and qualitative trans-
formations (Toomela’s first and fourth dimensions of difference), recent replications
of Bartlett’s experiments have conventionalized the analysis toward the mainstream
American practices of quantitative methods and mean sampling. Consider
Roediger’s (2000) recent use of the method of repeated reproduction codes
reproductions for “distortions” and “accurate” recall. The number of distortions
and accurate pieces are then calculated and averaged for each time delay, i.e. 15 min,
a week, and six months (see Fig. 1).
There are two major problems with this data presentation: (1) individual subjects
are lost in large samples and (2) analysis of intermediate forms becomes impossible.
The mean scores for each time condition isolate these intermediate forms from each
other; no avenue for pursuing an analysis of qualitative transformations remains
open. All qualitative transformations are hidden behind the quantitative analysis of
the number of distortions and accurate recalls. To access transformations we have to
begin our inquiry with individual cases and their change in time as Bartlett did.
Furthermore, in lumping subjects together Roediger et al. (2000) is blind to
exceptions to the average. Take the unlikely, though possible, case that subject
remembered the story more accurately after a week. This would be an extremely
insightful case to further analyze (from the standpoint of ideographic science) which
would be totally ignored by Roediger and colleagues analysis.
Third, after a thorough analysis of individual cases Bartlett proceeds by
identifying general trends seen across his subject pool. For example, in all cases
he notices that the “form” of the first reproduction persists through later
reproductions, unless significant time elapses between reproductions (such as a
year). The first reproduction seems to solidify the story in a tangible form—the most
significant transformations occur from the original to the first reproduction.
Another important aspect of the analysis at this stage is highlighting and offering
explanations for the most common and most interesting transformations and
omissions. To take just two examples, all subjects at one time or another replaced
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Fig. 1 A strictly quantitative
analysis of data obtained with
the method of repeated repro-
duction. Note: modified after
Roediger et al. (2000): 127
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“canoe” with “boat,” and proper names suffered significant change and then dropped
out completely in all but one case (ibid: 82). It is interesting to note that this single
exception to the general rule is not discarded as an irrelevant fluke. Bartlett devotes
an entire page to explaining and integrating this odd case into his general theory of
remembering in a later chapter (p. 208–209): He uses it to show the importance of
images along with schemata in reconstructive remembering, which I will speak of in
more depth in step four.
Here simply take note of Toomela’s fourth dimension of difference—attending to
exceptions—is illustrated in Bartlett’s work: He understands that deviance from the
norm can be just as revealing as identifying the norm itself.
Fourth, throughout the third stage of analysis Bartlett has been making links
between his other experiments. In fact, some categories of general analysis, such as
“inventions or importations” (p. 90), seem to be included precisely for this purpose.
However, no systematic theoretical synthesis is attempted between experimental
findings. His general theory of remembering, or we might go as far to say theory of
mind or consciousness, was only explicitly formulated much later after he had
recognized that Head’s theory of schemata (see Head 1920) could offer an
alternative to a trace theory of remembering. In what follows I will outline Bartlett’s
general theory of remembering, while making reference to some of the findings that
convinced him of its appropriateness. The concept “schema” has been used by
innumerable researchers since Bartlett in diverse ways (e.g., Neisser 1967; Minsky
1986; Shank and Abelson 1977). The intent of this article is to explore Bartlett’s
methodology and as such I will concentrate only on his use of the term.
Schemata
Schemata are active, developing, unconscious structures involved in all psycholog-
ical operations—contrast this with the most common explanation of his time that
said operations were the combination of individual sensations. In the case of
imagining, thinking and remembering construction occurs at a distance from
phenomena in the world but still occurs through schemata; Bartlett says we “turn
around on our schemata” when we perform these operations. When Bartlett’s
subjects repeatedly remembered War of the Ghosts the story looks less and less like
the original Native American ghost story and more and more like a conventional
English ghost story.1 The whole narrative structure changes and details like “hunting
seals” are transformed into more familiar activities such as “fishing.” Schemata
mediate our relation to the world and in so doing transform the world in a given
direction. Similarly, at the sociogenetic level Moscovici (1961) found that when
psychoanalysis was first brought to France the then unfamiliar activity was
represented by the Catholic media as being like the familiar activity, confession.
By representing psychoanalysis in this way certain features, such as “the talking
cure,” were highlighted while others, such as the centrality of sexuality, dropped out.
1I have used War of the Ghosts for many of my own experiments eighty years later in the same university
as Bartlett (i.e. Cambridge) and now find the story transforming in the direction of typical Hollywood
Ghost stories.
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Knowing presupposes the use of socially derived tools which transform their object
in the process of mediation.
Imagery
Something is still missing from this theory of remembering: if remembering was
determined by schemata alone our memories would quickly become abstract
reproductions of existing conventions. No subject, for example, should ever
remember the proper names “Egulac” and “Kamala.” Another mechanism must be
at work which constrains the abstracting character of schemata through a
particularizing process, a process that preserves the concrete details of an event.
One subject, in fact, remembered at first only the proper names “Egulac” and
“Kamala,” while every other subject (N=20) dropped them by the second
reproduction. Bartlett does not dismiss this single subject as an irrelevant fluke but
uses her to elaborate the second factor involved in remembering, what he calls
imagery. We also know from Luria’s (1987) study of the incredible mnemonist “S.”
(who could remember Italian verse flawlessly 15 years later without intermediate
rehearsals and without knowing how to speak Italian) and Yates’ (1966) illuminating
history mnemo-techniques the power that imagery has in capturing concrete details
and thus helping us to perform amazing memory fates.2 These studies fortify
Bartlett’s claim that two parallel processes are involved in remembering (one
abstracting and the other particularizing) and further show that we can train
ourselves to exaggerate the influence of the second.
The Germanic Englishman
Before finishing this section let us take a moment to highlight some of the German–
Austrian principles operating in Bartlett’s methodology: (1) Bartlett is clearly giving
a qualitative analysis of his data, which is the only way to capture transformations.
(2) He took into account subjects own experience while doing the experiment. This
information was used as data to help interpret subject’s reproductions and create
general theory. (3) The process of remembering was taken to be an activity bound up
with both biology and society but irreducible to either. Bartlett was critical of the
Ebbinghaus’s method precisely because it separated parts from the whole—in this
case, from meaning and society. (It should be noted that Ebbinghaus, though very
German, fits the model of a very American psychologist by Toomela’s criteria).
Bartlett created a method diametrically opposed to him, in that it attempted to access
and analyze remembering as it occurred in everyday life with all of its complex
interrelations. (4) Detailed analysis of single cases were given, including those that
contradicted the norm. (5) Bartlett tended not to use personality traits as an
2Obviously, neither Luria and Yates had published their work while Bartlett was writing. Allusion to their
studies here was simply intending to show the potential fruitfulness of interdisciplinary comparisons of
findings. Both Luria and Yates’ studies should not only support Bartlett’s identification of a mechanism in
remembering but also help elaborate the character of the mechanism.
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explanation of his results. At most he would make the distinction between
“visualizers” and “vocalizers.” More often he would employ more dynamic
descriptions of subjects which included their particular interests and ideals and
those that they share with the group. (6) The goal of Remembering was not to predict
what a person will remember but to explain how we remember. For example, he was
not interesting in showing what kind of person will remember “boats” instead of
“canoes” or under what circumstances unless this helped in understanding the
process behind the transformation. (7) Bartlett would frequently use results obtained
from one of his experiments to analyze another experiment in order to work out a
general theory that encompassed them all—his diverse experiments in perception
and imagination were all attempts to work out a single theory. (8) Remembering is a
masterpiece of psychology which took many years to think through. In it he forges
connections between anthropology, biology, sociology, philosophy, and psychology.
Such development and originality requires much concentration, deep thinking and
patience seldom found in the contemporary discipline which demands frequent
publications of statistically significant results.
Expanding the Method
Bartlett showed the effects of repeated reproduction on the remembered story—how
a story is transformed in a particular direction as a function of one’s interests and
group membership. From the transformations occurring across reproductions he
inferred mechanisms of mediation at work in remembering. As a supplement and
extension to Bartlett’s work, in this section, we will focus on transformations in the
course of a single reproduction session. By what process does the subject bring
about changes in the story in the concrete act of remembering? What means are used
in recall and what function do they play in steering the direction of transformation?
A conversational addition to Bartlett’s method of repeated reproduction was
created to answer these questions. Subjects were asked to “discuss and write down
the story you read earlier as accurately as possible.” In conversation we often answer
speak spontaneously to our interlocutor, without thinking before we speak. In fact, it
is common to see subjects ask a question to their partner and answer it themselves
before the other gets the chance. They also make a statement and then immediately
supply their own counter argument to it as if they were in debate with themselves.
Speaking to another often shifts to speaking with oneself. This being so,
conversation is then a legitimate medium to observe thinking as it occurs in real
time; speech is the “objectification” of thought displayed to the researcher for
analysis (See Mead 1934 for a philosophical defense of language as a medium to
study mind).
Using the conversation method it was found that remembering would at times
flow smoothly out of the subjects, from one to the other, while at other times a
rupture would occur, which required a deliberate act of confabulation in order to
mend it. Figure 2 outlines these different directions remembering can take. In
remembering a story, for example, each part of the story might be clear enough that I
can move effortlessly from beginning to end; however, it is more likely that I will be
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confronted, at several places, with an unclear memory in need of elaboration.3 When
this occurs I pause and began to consult my cultural conventions to establish what
might or should be in the missing spaces of my memory. I may even produce several
possible sceneries and then choose the one that feels best. My interlocutor will also
affect this process by either working harmoniously with me (e.g., filling in an
incomplete sentence of mine) or alternatively expressing doubt or contesting my
memory, in which case co-constructive confabulation and argumentation begins.
The process of confabulation (i.e. of rupture and reconstruction) is our primary
interest here. Specifically, we want to know how subjects overcome uncertainties in
memory—how they continue to construct a coherent story despite the missing
pieces. To explore this question consider the conversational reproduction and the
transformations occurring inside it, as well as between the reproduction and the
original.
The original story:
“He told it all, and then he became quiet. When the sun rose he fell down.
Something black came out of his mouth”
The first conversational reproduction:
Bill: He told his story and then became quiet. Right? And then the sun sets ... or
something
Henry: Well, he goes to sleep
Bill: It didn’t say anything about sleep. In the morning he stood up and died
Henry: Woke up and died
Bill: All right, so he became quite after telling the story. Ahh, a photographic
memory would be awesome right now. Ok now we’re to the point were he woke
up. Did they say he woke up?
Henry: I don’t think he stood up
Bill: I thought he
Henry: I don’t think he stood up. I think he did wake up
Bill: Ok, so he woke up (writes). Something black
Henry: came out of his mouth...
3I deliberately avoid the contemporary language of memory research which emphasizes “distortion” and
“errors” (as used by Roediger et al. 2000, see above). From my perspective the same phenomena can be
labeled “elaborations,” “expansions” and “additions.” By doing this I focus on remembering as a
constructive process rather than a faulty cognitive faculty. The first approach may be legitimate for applied
research but will falter in developing a solid theory of remembering as a social and constructive process.
Clear memory?  
Uncontested? 
Yes
Confabulation 
Next unit of story Start 
No
Fig. 2 Processes of
remembering
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Bill and Henry easily remember the parts before and after the phrase “When the
sun rose he fell down” but they must confabulate to remember what occurs
in-between these clear accessible memories. Though the original says nothing about
“sunsets,” “woke up,” or “sleep” these ideas are formed out of the vague memory of
the transition between night and day. We can see that bits of the original still linger
in their conversation but are radically reconstructed through confabulation. The
outstanding details (what we might call “imagery” following Bartlett) and a vague
schematic memory of the scene (it takes place at night in transition to day) must
somehow be brought together. The pair does this by making use of American
conventions surrounding night and day (people sleep at night and wake up in the
morning) as well as through metaphorical transitions (e.g. the different uses the
embodied up–down dichotomy).
If we outline the series of transformations, occurring through the interplay of
imagery and schemata (see Fig. 3), we see that there are three interrelated mech-
anisms of transformations:
(1) time period into conventional activity;
(2) a down-to-up activity into a different down-to-up activity; and
(3) an activity into its opposite.
Before exploring each in turn I must emphasize that these mechanisms are
systemically related in their facilitation of transformations. For example, the final
synthesis into ‘woke up’ might not have been possible without both mechanisms (2)
and (3).
(1) We have already discussed the power of conventions to shape thought in
Bartlett’s original experiments as well as in Moscovici’s famous study of
psychoanalysis. Here we clearly see the process of mediation by conventions
(or social schemata) in conversation as they are used to fill in gaps in the story
recall. Both subjects put forward possible accounts of what happened—both
wrong—from the standpoint of what conventionally does happen at these
particular times of day. Our conventions create a space of potential objects
which can then be used to integrate a fragmented memory.
(2) Lakoff and Johnson (1980) bring to our attention orientational metaphors that
“organize a whole system of concepts with respect to one another” (p. 14).
They give the example:
Consciousness Is Up; Unconsciousness Is Down
(2) Transformation catalyzed by “stood up”
“Sunsets”    “goes to sleep”    “woke up” 
(1) Transforms into conventional activity              (3) Transforms into opposite
associated with this time of day.
Fig. 3 Outline of the chain of
meaning transformations in the
dialogue above
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This provides the framework for the following expressions: “Get up. Wake up.
I’m up already. He rises early in the morning. He fell asleep. He dropped off to
sleep. He’s under hypnosis. He sank into a coma” (p.15). The physical basis
for these metaphors can be found in the fact that humans sleep laying down and
stand up when awaken which has an element of physical convention in it as
well. Returning to the analysis of the conversation the reader will be reminded
that the original states “the sun rose and he fell down.” Neither Bill nor Henry
arrive at this specific statement but both struggle to capture the down–up
movement within the context of night turning into day: Bill says, “he stood up”
and Henry argues, “he woke up.” The structuring dichotomy down-to-up
remains though the specific contents are lost.
(3) Much has been recently written on the unity of opposites (see especially
Josephs et al. 1999; Marková 2003). Suffice it to say here that ideas do not flow
at random in one’s stream of thought, nor do thoughts move through
associative bounds; instead, ideas are structured holistically in pairs or trios.
Take the simple experiment of Selz who asked subjects to report a
“coordinated” concept to the word “death.” One subject answered “life” and
gave the following retrospective report: After some reflection, “life” came to
mind as the solution. Before that I had formulated the question in unclear
words: ‘What is co-ordinated with death?’ The solution came to mind as
something familiar (Quoted in Kusch 1999: 65). As with Selz’s subject, a
whole complex has already been mobilized by Bill; it is a short step, for him,
to move to the familiar opposite of “sleep,” “wake up.” Opposites belong to
the same complex—they share much more in common with each other than
they do to other ideas and as such frequently transform themselves into their
other part.
The methodology used in the above analysis has stayed true to a thorough
examination of rich single cases. From single cases we derive the mechanisms that
drive and constrain transformations of social forms. In the same way that natural
selection explains the changes that occur in organisms over many generations, in
Darwinian Theory, we search for an explanation of the changes of thought that occur
in a single conversation oriented toward remembering a story. Here we have focused
on a small segment of conversation in which transformations through confabulation
are occurring. Like Bartlett’s use of the method of repeated reproduction, we were
not content to merely describe changes; we sought an explanation for them by going
deeper. This was achieved by reading between transformations in the remembered
object (e.g. “sunsets” to “he goes to sleep”) as well as from the original to
understand the general mechanisms guiding the change. To further advance our
analysis we would apply the mechanisms identified above (i.e., conventions,
metaphor, and unity of opposites) to other remembering conversations to both test
and elaborate our theory of transformations in remembering. The methodological
movement is from single case to generalization back to single case and so on
(Valsiner 2003). Through this analysis we should be able to step-by-step develop,
refine, and relate the processes at work in thought transformation of an object, such
as a memory.
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Overcoming Existing Forms of Experimentation
Human psychological phenomena are systemic, dynamic, and social. By systemic I
mean that the parts of an organism are connected together in complex relationships.
To understand any single part it is necessary to understand the system in which it is
embedded. Thus, the current mainstream methodology of isolating variables and
analyzing their affects as group averages is untenable. In studying parts separate
from the whole this approach breaks the systemic links between variables and thus
can tell us nothing about the holistic functioning of the person with her environment.
In Remembering Bartlett comments, “Statistical methods are, in a way, scientific
makeshifts. They are devices for handling instances in which numerous conditions
are simultaneously operating. They do not show how all these conditions are related,
and by themselves they throw no light on the nature of the conditions” (p. 7–8).
A systemic approach can be dynamic or static. To make it dynamic we must from
the outset assume that change is the name of the game. The question of “what is?”
needs to be replaced with “how do things change or maintain themselves as the
same.” Most psychological studies are content to merely point out differences
between two static groups. They do not recognize that individuals within a group are
themselves variable in respect to time and each other (Molenaar and Valsiner 2005).
Even longitudinal studies are a product of the static orientation; they merely create a
series of static snap shots (much like Roediger et al. 2000 study criticized above)
rather than trying to work out the coordinated system of changes.
Finally, all psychological operations—whether they are perception, attention,
thought, or remembering—are infused with the social (see Vygotsky and Luria
1994). The social process, when added to the dynamic psychological system,
reorganizes all parts already existing by creating a new whole. A mind is bound up
with the society to which it belongs; Society and mind are systemically linked.
However, when the social is studied in contemporary psychology it most often
becomes a study of an individual mind within a social context rather than social
context in an individual mind. The former approach separates mind and society into
two distinct domains; the latter aims to understand their interrelationship or how
society gets “inside” the developing person. We can understand contemporary
psychology’s motivation to split them apart: it makes no sense to consider the social
a variable if they cannot be neatly cleaved—mainstream psychologists would by left
without tools to study the social.
A methodology that reflects the fact that psychological phenomena are systemic,
dynamic and social is desperately needed. In the space that remains I will switch
gears and transform my thus far negative critique into a positive alternative. I will
sketch a general outline for a methodological program harmonious with the above
observations about psychological phenomena. It has already been argued that a
careful analysis of single cases is the only way of exploring qualitative trans-
formations, i.e., a coordinated system of changes. But how do we access, analyze
and build theory for such phenomena in an experimental situation?
The first step is to create experiments in which a change can be qualitatively
described. Bartlett’s experiments are an excellent example of this technique. The
specific detailed findings varied between his experiments but in all cases with all
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kinds of stimuli he found change in the direction of increasing conventionalization.
Similarly, in clinical neurology Luria (1970) began to investigate the nature of his
patient’s disorder by probing their abilities with simple qualitative experiments.
Working within a modified Vygotskian framework Luria conceptualized brain
processes as being parts of larger functional systems, e.g., speech is made possible
by various brain regions working in harmony with extra brain parts. One had to first
explore the surface transformations in functioning before positing which part of the
system was impaired. Description of a single case leads to an assessment of an
underline mechanism. In the analysis of the remembering conversation a single short
transcript gave us a glimpse at some of the processes of transformation occurring in
overcoming the ambiguity of a fuzzy memory.
This analysis is followed up by the second step where the mechanisms identified
are observed against other single cases. The general model will have to be adapted to
the findings of each new case. If one case out of 50 contradicts the theory we will
have to rework the theory until it explains the deviant case. We saw one of Bartlett’s
subjects solve the remembering task in a very different way than all the others.
Bartlett uses this contradictory case to explain the second mechanism in remember-
ing, imagery, which constrains the effects of schemata. It is in this step that the
researcher gradually works out the existing parts and how they are interrelated; in this
case, schemata and imagery are two processes working in opposite directions and
thus both supporting and constraining the influence of the other.
The third step involves challenging one’s theory through hypothesis testing.
Because we have not touched on this step yet in the previous sections I will explore
it in more detail here. Having worked out a general model of a system and how its
parts operate as a whole we should be able to systematically alter the system to bring
out predicted effects. The practice of prediction is central to the American approach
to psychology. Here we have appropriated the practice into single case analysis.
Now hypothesizes must be tested at the level of single cases. Luria (1970) after
having identified what part of the patient’s functional system was malfunctioning,
treatment involved giving patients an external mediator to compensate for the faulty
part. For example, one kind of patient had extreme difficulty understanding
relational expressions, such as “father’s brother” or “the circle under the triangle.”
These patients understood the words in isolation but could not synthesize the two
into a single whole, e.g. they understood “father” and “brother” but not the
integrated expression. To treat this condition Luria used images that expressed
complex relationships to fill in the gap in the functional system. Consider the
following iconic external mediator (Fig. 4):
Gradually, patients internalized the mediator such that they could synthesize
expressions without the help of the external aid. Luria predicted the direction in
which a transformation in a system will occur if specific conditions are created. In a
similar fashion, Einstein said that his theory of relativity could be tested under the
very specific conditions of a solar eclipse. The theory postulated that light rays will
bend in a gravitational field. During a solar eclipse in 1919 starlight was seen to
bend by the amount that Einstein’s theory had predicted.
Once we have worked out a general theory we can design specific experiments to
test our model. Returning again to the study of remembering we should be able to
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predict directions of transformation for a certain stimulus in a particular manner and
context of recall. From the sketchy model we already possess regarding the systemic
nature of remembering we can at this moment make several predictions:
(1) From Bartlett (1932) we know that material always changes in the direction of
one’s group conventions. In a specific form Moscovici’s theory of social
representations predicts systematic transformations in a scientific theory as it is
communicated and digested by a public (see Moscovici 2001: 33–36). We saw
above how psychoanalysis was represented in French society. Experimentally
we could simulate a like process by giving subjects a short scientific
explanation of say fertilization of an egg in the ovary. We would expect the
remembered explanation to increasing be represented as a social drama, in
which sperm and egg have human characteristics, intentions, and male–female
personalities (see Bangerter 2000, for a similar experiment which obtained
these results).
(2) We could also alter the means by which subjects remembered. Subjects could
be trained and then asked to form vivid imagery of a story as they read it.
Transformation should, if Bartlett’s theory is true, occur in the direction of the
concrete and in so doing lose continuity between episodes of the story.
(3) Before the remembering task the researcher could ask the subject to read a
particular kind of story every day for a month. Saturation in a particular genre
of story should then alter the way in which subject perceive and remember
stories with certain similarities to the familiar genre. The direction of
transformation in this case would be toward the story genre in which the
subject had been saturated. For all these experiments the methodological
movement is from particular case to general model back to particular case.
The researcher should feel free to move between the three steps. I put them in order
to represent that fact that later steps presuppose an understand of earlier ones. For
example, it makes no sense to test hypothesizes unless one has worked out a complex
theory in which to embed them. At any point the researcher can return to the general
phenomenon of interest for a careful descriptive study. Too often psychologists
conduct experiments with hypothesizes and variables without really understanding the
phenomena in which they are interested. Any science must begin with careful
observation before proceeding to general models, which can then be tested.
I must stress once again that at every step of one’s investigation the general rule
of advancement is by way of thorough analysis of single cases and their qualitative
Fig. 4 External mediator acting
as prosthetic device to recognize
relationships in speech. Note:
Modified after Luria (1970): 444
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transformations. The systemic, dynamic and social nature of psychological
phenomena dictates this and at the same time assures that transformations will not
be random—they will change in a specific direction holistically, depending on the
system and the stimulus used to activate schemata. The direction of change and
transformations at each junction will clue us into the mechanisms lying behind them.
Once formulated these can be tested, first against new cases, and later through
experiments designed to test hypothesizes. The novelty of this approach is its
rigorous utilization of single cases in all their variability in space and time. (In fact,
variability becomes the key component in developing one’s theory). Just as
Einstein’s predictions did not need a “control group” to compare with, our focus
on single cases provide a self-sufficient object of analysis. In these ways the new
methodology will be a radical break from most forms of experimentation previously
used in psychology, German–Austrian and American. Only in overcoming
methodologies past and present will we develop a rigorous psychology of culture
and thought in transformation.
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